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Amici are scholars of financial regulation and consumer finance. Amici submit this brief 
to lend their expertise regarding the statutory independence of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau mandated by Congress and the proper interpretation of federal succession statutes for 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici are leading scholars of financial regulation and consumer finance who 
submit this brief to lend their expertise regarding the statutory independence of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau mandated by Congress and the proper interpretation of federal 
succession statutes for leadership changes at the agency in light of Congress’ intent. Amici and 
their affiliations are listed in Appendix A. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case involves respect for law in two critical respects:  the mandate of agency 
independence and the orderly succession of agency leadership, which is a hallmark of American 
democracy. Plaintiff Leandra English took the high road by filling this suit and asking a neutral 
federal court to determine the outcome of this successorship dispute.  Defendants Donald J. 
Trump and Michael John Mulvaney instead opted to seize power at an agency rather than asking 
for a court to resolve the dispute. The preliminary injunction Plaintiff English seeks is 
appropriate to enable this dispute to be resolved in an orderly fashion through law rather than 
through a party’s creation of facts on the ground.  
The controversy in this case is who lawfully serves as the Acting Director of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or the Bureau): the Deputy Director, Plaintiff 
English, or the Director of Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Defendant Mulvaney. 
Deputy Director English’s appointment as Acting Director is authorized by the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act), which states that the 
Deputy Director of the CFPB “shall . . . serve as acting Director in the absence or unavailability 
of the Director.” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5)(B). In contrast, Defendant Mulvaney’s claim rests on 
the Defendant Trump’s invocation of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA) as 
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authority for the appointment of Defendant Mulvaney to be Acting CFPB Director. 5 U.S.C. § 
3345(a).  
As scholars of financial regulation, we believe that Deputy Director English’s claim is 
correct for a simple reason:  the only applicable statute to the succession question is the Dodd-
Frank Act. In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress expressly provided for a mandatory line of 
succession for the position of CFPB Director, stating that the Deputy Director “shall” serve as 
the Acting Director in the event of a vacancy. Congress selected this provision after considering 
and rejecting the FVRA during the drafting of the Dodd-Frank Act, and Congress’s selection of 
this succession provision is an integral part of its design of the CFPB as an agency with unique 
independence and protection from policy control by the White House.  Thus, the appointment of 
any White House official, but especially of the OMB Director as Acting CFPB Director is 
repugnant to the statutory design of the CFPB as an independent agency.  
The FVRA has no application to the position of CFPB Director. By its own terms, the 
FVRA is inapplicable as it yields to subsequently enacted statutes with express mandatory 
provisions for filling vacancies at federal agencies.  This is apparent from the text of the FVRA, 
from the FVRA’s legislative history, and from the need to comport with the basic constitutional 
principle that a law passed by an earlier Congress cannot bind a subsequent Congress.  
Moreover, the FVRA does not apply to “any member who is appointed by the President, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate to any” independent agencies with a multi-member 
board. 5 U.S.C. § 3349c(1). The CFPB Director is such a “member,” because the CFPB Director 
also serves as a member of a separate multi-member independent agency:  the Board of Directors 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 
Deputy Director English is seeking a preliminary injunction, and it should be granted. As 
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will be shown, Deputy Director English has a high likelihood of success on the merits given the 
strength of her statutory arguments that the Dodd-Frank Act controls the CFPB Directorship 
succession. Unless the Court grants Deputy Director English’s request for a preliminary 
injunction, the CFPB will suffer irreparable harm because it will be subjected to the direct 
political control by the White House that Congress took pains to forbid. Moreover, without a 
preliminary injunction, Defendant Mulvaney will continue to take actions that may compromise 
the CFPB’s positions in litigation. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Stacy Cowley, 
Consumer Bureau’s New Leader Steers a Sudden Reversal, N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 5, 2017. Nor will 
the President’s rights be in any way limited by such a preliminary injunction:  the President 
remains able to seek Senate confirmation of a nominee for CFPB Director. All the President is 
being asked to do is fish or cut bait and proceed through normal constitutional order. The 
granting of a preliminary injunction is also very much in the public interest as it enables the 
controversy over the rightful claim to the CFPB Directorship to be resolved through an impartial 
court and not through a naked grab of power by the President. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Text, Structure, Purpose, and Legislative History of the Dodd-Frank Act Show 
That It Is the Exclusive Mechanism Governing the Succession of the CFPB Director 
A. “Shall” Means “Shall”:  Congress Unambiguously Chose to Specify a 
Succession Line for CFPB Director in the Dodd-Frank Act 
The Dodd-Frank Act expressly provides a mandatory line of succession for the CFPB 
Director:  in the event of the “absence or unavailability” of the Director—a phrase that 
Defendants concede are capacious enough to readily encompass vacancy—the Deputy Director 
“shall” serve as Acting Director. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5)(B) (emphasis added). By using the 
word “shall” Congress could not have been clearer:  the Dodd-Frank Act provides a mandatory 
and therefore exclusive line of succession for the CFPB Director. The Dodd-Frank Act’s 
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language does not brook any alternative method of appointment of an Acting Director for the 
CFPB. Applying the FVRA to allow for Defendant Mulvaney’s appointment would make a 
nullity of Congress’s express command.  
B. The Legislative History of the Dodd-Frank Act Shows that Congress 
Rejected the Application of the FVRA to the CFPB Director 
The legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Act indicates that Congress deliberately 
rejected the FVRA as a line of succession in favor of the Deputy Director automatically 
becoming Acting Director. The version of the Dodd-Frank Act that passed the House envisioned 
a “Consumer Financial Protection Agency” that would initially be led by a single Director prior 
to the agency transitioning into a multi-member commission. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 
4102(b)(6)(B) (2010). The House Bill provided that the FVRA would apply during the period 
when there was only a single Director. Id. Notably, the House Bill did not include make the 
Director (or subsequent commission chair) a member of the FDIC Board.  In contrast to the 
House Bill, the Senate Bill, S. 3217, contained the single Director structure and exact language 
regarding line of succession that were adopted by the Conference Committee and ultimately 
enacted as the Dodd-Frank Act.  
The legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Act shows that Congress was fully aware of the 
FVRA as a possibility, at least when the agency’s Director did not also serve on what is 
unquestionably a multi-member board of an independent agency, as discussed infra part II.B.  In 
the final legislation, Congress deliberately elected not to use the FVRA as a line of succession, 
instead making clear that the FVRA would not apply both by the use of mandatory “shall” 
language in the line of succession and by placing the CFPB Director on a multi-member board of 
an independent agency and thus outside the scope of the FVRA.  
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C. The Dodd-Frank Act’s CFPB Director Succession Provision Is Integral to the 
Agency Independence Mandated by Congress 
The Dodd-Frank Act’s provision governing the succession of the CFPB Director is not 
happenstance, but is integral to the design of the CFPB as an agency with a unique structure (as 
reflected in the Senate Bill, the structure of which was ultimately adopted) whose goal is 
maximizing the agency’s independence from the President while maintaining accountability to 
Congress and the public.1   
1. Congress Designed the CFPB to Have Maximum Independence from 
Political Interference  
Independence from political control by the White House has been a cornerstone of 
federal bank regulation since the 1863 enactment of the National Bank Act. Congress has 
endowed all federal bank regulators with independence to ensure the safety and soundness of our 
nation’s banking system and the financial health of American citizens. See, e.g., Arthur E. 
Wilmarth Jr., The Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to Undermine the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881, 907-908 (2012). Absent such 
independence from political interference, the President could readily goose the economy for 
short-term political gain via control of the credit channel or even direct financing to favored 
political groups and away from disfavored groups. The independence of federal bank regulators 
from daily political control by the White House is essential for ensuring financial stability and 
that financial institutions are not used for political ends.  
 When Congress created the CFPB in the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, it was particularly 
concerned with ensuring the agency’s independence. See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 11 (2010); id. 
at 174 (a “strong and independent Bureau with a clear mission to keep consumer protections up-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 We note that there is controversy about the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure. 
These issues are not before the Court in this litigation, and need not be addressed; avoidance 
principles dictate that the agency’s structure, although novel, should be presumed constitutional.  
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to-date with the changing marketplace will reduce the incentive for State action and increase 
uniformity”); Statement of Senator Cardin, Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—
Conference Report, Cong. Rec. S5870, S5871 (July 15, 2010) (“This legislation will create a 
consumer bureau . . . that is independent, so the consumer is represented in the financial 
structure”); Statement of Sen. Kaufman, id. at S5885 (stating that the Dodd-Frank Act 
“establishes an independent [CFPB] with strong and autonomous rulemaking authority . . .”). 
Congress created the CFPB in response to the 2008 financial crisis, which wreaked havoc in its 
wake. Rampant consumer abuses in the residential mortgage market precipitated the crisis, 
nearly destroying the global financial system, throwing millions of Americans out of work, and 
culminating in several million home foreclosures. See, e.g., KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. 
MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS:  RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 14-
148 (2011); Christopher J. Goodman & Stephen M. Marice, Employment loss and the 2007-09 
recession: an overview, MONTHLY LABOR REV. 3 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, April 2011), 
http://bit.ly/2ko7Es3. Post-mortems of the crisis revealed that conscious forbearance by the 
federal bank regulators, who had primary responsibility for consumer financial protection at the 
time, was a major contributing factor in the 2008 crisis. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra, at 149-205; 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:  FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE 
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xvii-xviii, xxi, xxiii 
(2011). These regulators were tasked with both ensuring bank profitability and consumer 
protection and prioritized the short-term profitability of banks over consumer protection.  
Part of the reason for the bank regulators’ inaction was the conflict between their mission 
of ensuring bank safety and soundness and their consumer protection mission.  Adam J. Levitin, 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. 
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SERV. L. 321, 329-31 (2013). To address this problem, Congress transferred primary federal 
authority for consumer financial protection from the existing federal bank regulators to the 
CFPB, which has one sole mission:  protecting the financial well-being of American consumers.  
A second problem that plagued bank regulators, however, was “regulatory capture”—
when agencies come to serve the interests of regulated industries rather than those of the public. 
See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial 
Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2041-45 (2014) (hereinafter “Levitin, 
Financial Politics”). The concern about capture animated proposals for a consumer financial 
protection agency, see U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New 
Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation 29 (2009) (putting forth a 
proposal for a federal consumer financial protection agency and expressing concerns about 
regulatory capture); Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 99 n.325 (2008) (proposing a consumer financial protection agency and noting that 
“minimizing the risk of capture is a main regulatory-design challenge in implementing our 
proposal.”), and is reflected in the unique structure of the CFPB. Levitin, supra at 2056.  
Congress sought to insulate the new CFPB from industry capture and partisan politics by 
vesting it with important mainstays of independence from the executive branch and the White 
House. Those safeguards include formal status as an independent agency, a Director appointed 
by the President and confirmed by the Senate who can be fired only for good cause, a locale 
outside of the executive branch, independent funding, and exemption from reviews by OMB and 
the White House.2 Dodd-Frank’s directive on the appointment of the CFPB’s Acting Director is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Congress took care to balance the CFPB’s independence with checks making the CFPB 
accountable to Congress, the courts, the President, and the public in multiple ways. Levitin, 
Financial Politics, supra at 2057. The CFPB’s Director must appear at least twice a year before 
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integral to this statutory scheme of agency independence. 
i. Formal Independent Status 
The Dodd-Frank Act provision establishing the CFPB spells out the agency’s 
independence: “There is established in the Federal Reserve System, an independent bureau to be 
known as the ‘Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection’ . . .” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (emphasis 
added); accord, Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference 874 (2011), 
http://bit.ly/2ntHMfa (the CFPB “will be an independent bureau within the Federal Reserve 
System”).  
ii. Term and Tenure of CFPB Director 
The CFPB’s leadership structure is fundamental to Congress’s design of an agency free 
from independence from direct daily policy control by the President. The CFPB is headed by a 
Director, who “shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate,” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(2), and “shall serve for a term of 5 years.” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(1). 
This provision protects the CFPB’s autonomy by allowing the Director to serve past the four-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the relevant Congressional Committees and submit a comprehensive report on topics ranging 
from regulatory obstacles and objectives to budgetary justifications, as well as an analysis of past 
and anticipated agency actions. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5493(b)(3)(C), (d)(4), 5496, 5497(e)(4)(A). The 
Government Accountability Office conducts an annual audit of the CFPB, 12 U.S.C. §§ 
5496a(b), 5497(a)(4)(D), (a)(5), and the Federal Reserve’s Inspector General oversees the CFPB 
through reviews, 5 U.S.C. App. 3. Ultimately, Congress can also amend or repeal the authorizing 
legislation for the CFPB.  
CFPB rulemakings are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a). 
The Dodd-Frank Act also made the CFPB one of only three agencies subject to the Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, which requires the CFPB to consult with, and 
gain direct input from, small businesses regarding proposed rulemakings. 5 U.S.C. § 609(d)(2). 
In addition, the CPFB is the only agency whose rulemakings are subject to a veto by the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council. 12 U.S.C. § 5513. The CFPB lacks independent litigation 
authority before the Supreme Court without leave of the Attorney General, 12 U.S.C. § 5564(e), 
and the CFPB’s rulemakings and enforcement actions are subject to judicial review. 12 U.S.C. § 
5491(a). Congress further has the power to overturn CFPB rules under the Congressional Review 
Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq.  
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year term of the President.  
The Dodd-Frank Act further enhanced the independence of the CFPB by providing that 
that the President may only “remove the Director for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office.” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3). This provision augments the independence of the 
CFPB by shielding the Director from being fired because of a policy disagreement with the 
President. Without the for-cause removal provision, a President could credibly threaten the 
CFPB Director’s removal unless the Director complied with the President’s requests, and if the 
Director did not comply, the President could replace the Director with a new (and presumably 
compliant) Director. That, in turn, would allow a President to attempt to achieve a short-term 
boost to the economy by reducing consumer finance regulation and loosening credit, leaving the 
costs of unsustainable credit to a future administration.  Likewise, if the President could replace 
the CFPB Director at will, the President could freely interfere with civil enforcement decisions. 
In addition, without protection from termination at will, the concentrated and well-heeled 
financial services industry lobby could pressure a President to relax regulations through removal 
or the threat of removal of the Director. Consumer advocates cannot compete with such well-
heeled lobbying. For-cause-only removal helps level the playing field between industry and 
consumer interests by ensuring that industry or select companies cannot forestall or undo 
regulation simply by persuading the President to threaten the removal of the CFPB Director. 
Instead, it is Congress that retains the ultimate oversight over CFPB policy.  
iii. Organizational Situs 
Congress located the CFPB within the Federal Reserve System as “an independent 
Bureau.” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a). Because the Federal Reserve System itself is outside of the 
executive branch, this decision helps insulate the CFPB from undue political influence.  
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This arrangement—locating the CFPB outside of the executive branch—is the norm for 
financial regulators:  the Federal Reserve System is independently located, as are the FDIC, 
National Credit Union Administration, Federal Trade Commission, Federal Housing Finance 
Agency, Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission.  Although the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is located within the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, it enjoys statutory freedom from interference from the Treasury 
Secretary. 12 U.S.C. § 1; 31 U.S.C. § 321(c). Even though the OCC is the only financial 
regulator located within a department, it is considered independent from the executive branch, as 
are all the other federal regulators. See Henry B. Hogue, Marc Labonte & Baird Webel, 
Independence of Federal Financial Regulators: Structure, Funding, and Other Issues 25 (Cong. 
Res. Serv. R43391, Feb. 28, 2017), http://bit.ly/2AWAfev (“Hogue”). 
Congress not only provided for the CFPB to be independent of the President, but also 
cordoned it off from interference by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. Under the 
Dodd-Frank Act, absent other statutory authority, the Federal Reserve Board may not:  (1) 
“intervene in any matter or proceeding before the Director, including examinations or 
enforcement actions;” (2) “appoint, direct, or remove any officer or employee of the Bureau;” or 
(3) “merge or consolidate the Bureau, or any of the functions of the Bureau, with any division or 
office of the Board of Governors or the Federal reserve banks.” 12 U.S.C. § 5492(c)(2). 
Similarly, the Federal Reserve Board “may not delay or prevent the issuance of any rule or order 
of the Bureau” and “[n]o rule or order of the Bureau shall be subject to approval or review by the 
Board of Governors.” 12 U.S.C. § 5492(c)(3).   
In sum, Congress took pains to assure the CFPB’s independence by locating it outside of 
the executive branch and insulating it from Federal Reserve Board interference. Congress further 
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decided to fund the CFPB’s operations with Federal Reserve System funds, rather than 
appropriated funds, to bolster the agency’s autonomy, as the next section discusses. 
iv. Independent Funding 
Industry capture of agencies can occur in various ways, but agency funding is a key 
pressure point. Congress has historically funded federal bank regulators independently of the 
appropriations process to shield bank oversight from political interference. See Hogue, supra, at 
25 (“[T]he annual appropriation processes and periodic reauthorization legislation provide 
Congress with opportunities to influence the size, scope, priorities, and activities of any 
agency”). For this reason, Congress exempts all federal bank regulators from Congressional 
appropriations for their funding.3  Id.  
While the CFPB, like all other federal bank regulators, is not subject to the appropriations 
process, it differs from other federal bank regulators in that it does not generate its own funding. 
Instead, the CFPB’s funding consists of transfers from the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve, capped at twelve percent of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System 
reported in the Federal Reserve System’s 2009 annual report, adjusted for inflation. 12 U.S.C. § 
5497(a)(1)-(a)(2).  
Congress specifically placed the CFPB on independent financial footing due to the 
danger of reliance on the appropriations process. S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 163 (2010) (“[T]he 
assurance of adequate funding [for the CFPB from the Federal Reserve Board], independent of 
the Congressional appropriations process, is absolutely essential to the independent operations of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The Federal Reserve System earns revenues from services to its members such as 
check-clearing, securities investments, and interest on loans. The OCC and the FHFA primarily 
fund themselves through fees on their regulated entities. The FDIC and the National Credit 
Union Administration generate revenue primarily through premiums paid by their insured 
entities for federal deposit and share insurance respectively. See Hogue, supra, at 26. 
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any financial regulator”). As the Senate Report (id.) accompanying the Dodd-Frank Act 
explained, Congress had observed the harm of political pressure on the predecessor to FHFA: 
This was a hard learned lesson from the difficulties faced by the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), which was subject to 
repeated Congressional pressure because it was forced to go through the annual 
appropriations process. It is widely acknowledged that this helped limit 
OFHEO’s effectiveness. For that reason, ensuring that OFHEO’s successor 
agency—the Federal Housing Finance Agency—would not be subject to 
appropriations was a high priority for the Committee and the Congress in the 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. 
The cap on the CFPB’s budget is unique among federal bank regulators, and its budget is, 
as a result, modest compared to the budgets of other federal financial regulators. See id. at 163-
164. Thus, while the CFPB is structured to be independent of the political horse-trading and 
logrolling of the appropriations process, it is still kept under tighter budgetary control than any 
other federal bank regulator.   
v. Limitations on Executive Oversight 
Consistent with its treatment of other independent federal bank regulators, Congress 
further exempted CFPB actions from executive branch review. In one such measure, Congress 
provided that legislative recommendations, testimony, and comments by the CFPB are not 
subject to executive branch review, whether by OMB or any other federal officer or agency.  
Specifically, Dodd-Frank states that:  
No officer or agency of the United States shall have any authority to require 
the Director or any other officer of the Bureau to submit legislative 
recommendations, or testimony or comments on legislation, to any officer or 
agency of the United States for approval, comments, or review prior to the 
submission of such recommendations, testimony, or comments to the Congress 
[as long as those CFPB documents indicate that the views expressed therein 
are the CFPB’s own].  
12 U.S.C. § 5493(c)(4).  
In another example of independence from executive oversight, Congress gave the CFPB 
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a statutory exemption from budget review by OMB. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFPB must 
provide copies of the Director’s financial operating plans, forecasts, and quarterly reports to the 
Director of OMB. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(4)(A). In a companion provision, however, Congress 
stated that there is no “obligation on the part of the Director [of the CFPB] to consult with or 
obtain the consent or approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget with 
respect to any report, plan, forecast, or” other information provided to OMB. 12 U.S.C. § 
5497(a)(4)(E); cf. 12 U.S.C. § 1827 (extending similar protection to the FDIC). Similarly, 
nothing in the OMB reporting requirements may “be construed as implying . . . any jurisdiction 
or oversight over the affairs or operations of the Bureau.” 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(4)(E). 
Finally, the CFPB, like all federal bank regulators, is free from the usual requirement that 
agencies submit their rules to OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for 
review and cost-benefit analysis. Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 
Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993). Executive Order 12866 contains an express exemption for 
agencies deemed to be “independent regulatory agencies” under the Paperwork Reduction Act. 
Id. § 3(b). The Paperwork Reduction Act’s list of independent regulatory agencies includes the 
CFPB and other federal bank regulators. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5). In this way, the CFPB and other 
federal bank regulators are exempt from White House review of their rules. 
2. The Dodd-Frank Act’s Directorship Succession Provision Is Integral to 
the Independence Congress Mandated for the CFPB 
Dodd-Frank’s provision on the appointment of the CFPB’s Acting Director is a key pillar 
supporting the architecture of agency independence that defines the CFPB. Under Dodd-Frank, 
the White House’s single most important role with respect to the CFPB—the appointment of the 
permanent CFPB Director—may only be made “by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(2). In contrast, no federal statute requires Senate confirmation for 
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appointment of an Acting Director for the CFPB. Thus, if the President had authority to name the 
CFPB’s Acting Director under the FVRA, the President could bypass Senate confirmation of the 
agency’s head by appointing the CFPB’s Acting Director for up to 210 days without nominating 
a permanent Director. 5 U.S.C. § 3346(a)(1). Conceivably, the President could stack back-to-
back 210-day terms and delay a nomination until the end of a Presidency, resulting in up to 8 
years of freely removable Acting Directors of the President’s choice, followed by a 5-year term 
for a duly confirmed Director of the President’s nomination. To avoid that scenario, Congress 
insisted that the CFPB’s Deputy Director “serve as acting Director in the absence or 
unavailability of the Director.” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5)(B). Because the CFPB’s Deputy Director 
is a career civil servant who is appointed by the CFPB’s Director, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5)(A), the 
President may not name a political appointee as CFPB Director without Senate confirmation.   
II. The FVRA Does Not Provide a Standing Alternative Method of Appointing an 
Acting Director for the CFPB. 
Defendants argue that the FVRA provides a standing alternative method of filling 
vacancies at federal agencies, even when another method is specified by statute. See White 
House Statement on Director Mulvaney’s Status as Acting Director of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, Nov. 27, 2017, at http://bit.ly/2zIofxn. This claim is wrong because it ignores 
the text and legislative history of the FVRA and a fundamental constitutional principle.  
A. The FVRA Does Not Apply When a Statutory Provision Expressly 
Designates an Acting Officer, as the Dodd-Frank Act Does. 
The FVRA provides that it is the “exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an acting 
official to perform the functions and duties of any office of an Executive agency … for which 
appointment is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, unless—(1) a statutory provision expressly—…(B) designates an officer or employee to 
perform the functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in an acting capacity.”  5 
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U.S.C. § 3347.  The Dodd-Frank Act’s CPFB succession provision is “a statutory provision 
expressly…designat[ing] an officer or employee to perform the functions and duties of [the 
CFPB Director] temporarily in an acting capacity.”   12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5)(B).  Thus the 
FVRA, by its own terms, does not apply to the CFPB Directorship.   
The Dodd-Frank Act’s use of the word “shall” in the CPFB Director succession provision 
is as express a statutory provision as could be conceived without requiring the use of “magic 
words” directly referencing the FVRA. The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that 
“magic words” are not required for a provision to be express. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 
302, 310 (1955) (“Exemptions from the terms of the . . . Act are not lightly to be presumed in 
view of the statement . . . that modifications must be express[.] But . . . [u]nless we are to require 
the Congress to employ magical passwords in order to effectuate an exemption from the . . . Act, 
we must hold that the present statute expressly supersedes the . . . provisions of that 
Act”); Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 149 (2005) (Scalia, J. concurring) (“When the 
plain import of a later statute directly conflicts with an earlier statute, the later enactment 
governs, regardless of its compliance with any earlier-enacted requirement of an express 
reference or other ‘magical password.’”) (emphasis in original). The Dodd-Frank Act’s CFPB 
Director succession provision is an express provision opting out of the FVRA succession 
mechanism, so the FVRA has no applicability to determining who is the rightful Acting Director 
of the CFPB.  
B. The FVRA Does Not Apply to Members of Boards of Independent Agencies, 
and the CFPB Director Is a Member of the Board of an Independent Agency 
The FVRA not only has an exclusion for express opt-outs of its coverage, but it is also 
inapplicable to: 
[A]ny member who is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate to any board, commission, or similar entity that—  
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(A) is composed of multiple members; and 
(B) governs an independent establishment or Government corporation. 
5 U.S.C. § 3349c(1).  
The CFPB Director is a member of the multi-member board of an independent 
Government corporation, namely the five-member Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation. 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(1)(B). Appointment as the CFPB Director, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, is not only an appointment to lead the CFPB, but also 
to serve as a member of FDIC Board. As a multi-member board of an independent Government 
corporation, the FDIC Board is therefore clearly exempt from the FVRA.4   
 There is an important policy foundation for the exclusion of multi-member boards of 
independent entities from the FVRA’s ambit. Multi-member boards of independent agencies and 
other entities frequently have partisan balance requirements or expertise requirements or 
geographic affiliation requirements. For example, the FDIC Board has a partisan balance 
requirement, and a requirement that one of its members have State bank supervisory experience. 
12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(1)-(2). If the President could use the FVRA to appoint acting members of 
multi-member boards of independent entities, he could circumvent the statutory qualification 
restrictions on these entities. Thus, if the FVRA applied to multi-member boards of independent 
agencies, the President could stack the FDIC Board solely with members of his own political 
party.  The President does have considerable power to shape the membership of multi-member 
boards of independent agencies, but the exercise of this power is subject to the advice and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 We note that the Office of Legal Counsel memorandum on which the Defendant 
President apparently relied in appointing Defendant Mulvaney did not mention the CFPB 
Director’s role as an FDIC Board member, much less analyze how it affects the application of 
the FVRA. Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Steven A. Engel to Donald F. 
McGahn II, Counsel to the President, Nov. 25, 2017, at http://bit.ly/2iSSZRQ. A post-
controversy memorandum from the CFPB’s General Counsel similarly failed to consider the 
CFPB Director’s membership on the FDIC Board. See Memorandum from Mary McLeod, 
General Counsel to CFPB Senior Leadership Team, Nov. 25, 2017, at http://bit.ly/2k0pKfO.  
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consent of the Senate.   
 It is for this reason that the FVRA does not extend to vacancies on multi-member 
independent agency boards. The appointment of an Acting CFPB Director is necessarily the 
appointment of an acting member of the FDIC Board.  This role cannot be separated from the 
CFPB Director’s role at the CFPB; it is a mandatory statutory package, and the service of an 
invalidly Acting CFPB Director on the FDIC Board would jeopardize the legality of the FDIC’s 
actions. See FEC v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
Accordingly, the President cannot use the FVRA to appoint the Acting CFPB Director. Instead, 
the only applicable statute to the succession of CFPB Director is the Dodd-Frank Act.  
C. The FVRA Does Not Apply to Subsequently Enacted Statutes that Expressly 
Provide for a Line of Succession. 
Defendants’ argument that the FVRA provides a standing alternative method of filling 
vacancies at federal agencies stands on a selective reading of the FVRA’s legislative history that 
does not comport with a basic constitutional principle—an earlier Congress cannot bind a later 
Congress.  Defendants contend that section 3347 of the FVRA provides that the FVRA is either 
the exclusive or alternative succession provision for filling a vacancy; the FVRA is always an 
option no matter what another statute provides.  Yet, Defendants recognize that section 3347 is 
open to another (correct) reading, namely that the word “exclusive” simply makes clear that the 
FVRA applies absent an express-out out provision that cause another statute to control.  
Accordingly, Defendants’ position stands on the legislative history of the FVRA (and on a single 
reported decision that also relied on the FVRA’s legislative history).   
1. Legislative History Indicates That the FVRA Is Not an Alternative 
Method of Filling a Vacancy If a Subsequently Enacted Statute Expressly 
Provides for Another Mandatory Mechanism for Filling a Vacancy. 
Defendants rely on the FVRA’s legislative history to support their reading that the FVRA 
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is either an exclusive possibility or an alternative possibility for filling vacancies at federal 
agencies.  The problem with this claim is that it fails to note that the FVRA’s legislative history 
carefully distinguishes between the application of the FVRA to existing statutes and to 
subsequently enacted statutes.  The FVRA’s legislative history shows that the FVRA is not 
meant to serve as an alternative for the succession mechanisms in subsequent statutes, only for 
those in existing statutes.  
The Senate Report on the FVRA explains that that there are three exceptions to its 
application. The first deals with subsequently enacted statutes, which “govern” if they “expressly 
provide” that they supersede the FVRA. The second deals with existing statutes, for which the 
Vacancies Act stands as an alternative appointment method for acting officers, and the third, not 
relevant here, deals with recess appointments: 
[Section 3347 of the FVRA] does allow temporary appointments to be 
made other than through the Vacancies Reform Act in three narrowly 
delineated exceptions. First, where Congress provides that a statutory provision 
expressly provides that it supersedes the Vacancies Reform Act, the other 
statute will govern. But statutes enacted in the future purporting to or argued to 
be construed to govern the temporary filling of offices covered by this statute 
are not to be effective unless they expressly provide that they are superseding 
the Vacancies Reform Act. Second, the bill retains existing statutes that are in 
effect on the date of enactment of the Vacancies Act of 1998 that expressly 
authorize the President, or the head of an executive department to designate an 
officer to perform the functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in 
an acting capacity, as well as statutes that expressly provide for the temporary 
performance of the functions and duties of an office by a particular officer or 
employee. (This includes statutes that provide for an automatic designation, 
unless the President designates another official). The Committee is aware of 
the existence of statutes specifically governing a vacancy in 41 specific offices, 
40 of which would be retained by this bill.... 
 S. Rep. 105-250, 1998 WL 404532 at *15.  
The Dodd-Frank Act clearly falls into the first exception contemplated in the legislative 
history: it is a statute enacted subsequent to the FVRA, and it has express language indicating 
that it supersedes the FVRA because it states that the Deputy Director “shall” serve as acting 
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Director in the event of the Director’s absence or unavailability.  
Defendants’ reliance on the FVRA legislative history is founded on a selective reading of 
that legislative history. Defendants ignore the first exception to the FVRA discussed in the 
legislative history. That first exception is the one dealing with subsequently enacted statutes. 
Instead, the President focuses on the second exception mentioned in the legislative history, but 
that exception is expressly inapposite, as it deals with pre-existing statutes. Likewise, the sole 
reported case on the FVRA is also inapplicable as it dealt with the General Counsel of the 
National Labor Relations Board, one of the 40 offices specifically mentioned in the legislative 
history as under an existing statute. Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant Support Services, 186 F. 3d 550 (9th 
Cir. 2016). Similarly, the opinions issued by the Office of Legal Counsel on the FVRA deal with 
existing, rather than subsequent statutes. See, e.g., Acting Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget, 27 Op. O.L.C. 121 (2003); Authority of the President to Name an Acting Attorney 
General, 31 Op. O.L.C. 208 (2007). As a result, none of these precedents applies to the CFPB 
Directorship.5   
2. A Law Passed by an Earlier Congress Cannot Bind a Future Congress 
The FVRA’s legislative history’s distinction between the application of the FVRA for 
existing and subsequently enacted statutes is also the only reading that is consistent with a 
fundamental constitutional principle:  a law passed by an earlier Congress cannot bind a future 
Congress. If Defendants’ reading were correct, it would mean that an earlier Congress (the 
FVRA Congress in 1998) could bind a later Congress (the Dodd-Frank Congress in 2010) by 
requiring the later Congress to have the FVRA as an alternative method of filling vacancies for 
any statutory position created by the later Congress, notwithstanding the later Congress’s express 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Notably, the OLC opinion on the CFPB on which the President claims to have relied did 
not address the part of the FVRA’s legislative history dealing with subsequent statutes, only that 
with existing statutes, despite the Dodd-Frank Act being a subsequent statute. 
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rejection of that alternative.   The FVRA Congress could amend previously existing statutes, but 
it could not require the FVRA to always be an alternative method of appointment no matter what 
actions a subsequent Congress would take.   
It is axiomatic that one Congress cannot bind a subsequent one through legislation; were 
it otherwise, a Congress could exercise dead hand control even if the electorate had subsequently 
rejected it at the polls. Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 465 (1908); United States 
v. Shull, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1061 (S.D. Ohio 2011). The democratic edifice of American 
government cannot tolerate an earlier Congress binding a subsequent one through legislation. It 
is for this reason that the legislative history of the FVRA recognized that future statutes had to be 
treated differently than existing statutes. Accordingly, Defendants’ position that the FVRA 
stands as a constant alternative line of succession is incorrect. The FVRA might be an alternative 
method for filling vacancies at agencies created under existing statutes, but it cannot be for 
agencies created after its enactment when a subsequently enacted statutory line of succession 
supersedes the application of the FVRA.6  
III. The Appointment of the OMB Director as Acting CFPB Director Violates the Dodd-
Frank Act’s Requirement of Statutory Independence for the CFPB. 
Even if the Court were to determine that the FVRA governs the CFPB Directorship 
succession, Defendant Mulvaney and any other OMB official should still be precluded from 
appointment to the Acting CFPB Director position. Defendant Trump’s appointment of 
Defendant Mulvaney epitomizes the problem Congress sought to address by creating an 
exclusive mechanism in the Dodd-Frank Act for filling the post of Acting Director of the CFPB.  
Defendant Mulvaney is OMB Director. OMB “is an office in the Executive Office of the 
President,” 31 U.S.C. § 501, which makes Defendant Mulvaney an official of the White House. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For this reason, holding that the FVRA controls over the Dodd-Frank Act does not, in 
fact, further the goal of constitutional avoidance, contrary to the claim of certain other amici.  
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Defendant Mulvaney has told the press that he is continuing to head OMB while assuming office 
as the CFPB’s Acting Director. See Renae Merle, Dueling officials spend chaotic day vying to 
lead federal consumer watchdog, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2017) (“Mulvaney said he plans to 
work three days a week at the agency and three days at OMB”). Thus, the White House 
effectively has taken over the CFPB by appointing Defendant Mulvaney as CFPB Acting 
Director while he remains head of OMB. Indeed, in a press conference on November 27, 2017, 
Defendant Mulvaney confirmed this turn of events, declaring: “The Trump Administration is 
now in charge” of the CFPB. See, e.g., http://cs.pn/2AxVT65.  
Likewise, Defendant Mulvaney’s appointment as CFPB Acting Director is in blatant 
violation of Congress’ repeated injunctions against OMB intrusion into CFPB decisions. 
Congress specified in the Dodd-Frank Act that the CFPB is to be an “independent bureau,” 12 
U.S.C. § 5491(a), yet a top White House official has now taken control of the agency, without 
opportunity for Senate confirmation. Furthermore, this violates Congress’ directive denying the 
OMB “jurisdiction or oversight over the affairs or operations of the Bureau”, 12 U.S.C. § 
5497(a)(4)(E).  
Defendant Mulvaney’s actions as putative Acting Director of the CFPB contravene other 
important statutory provisions that wall off the CFPB from OMB. In Dodd-Frank, Congress 
prohibited officials from OMB and the White House from requiring the CFPB to submit 
“legislative recommendations, or testimony or comments on legislation” to them for prior review 
or approval. 12 U.S.C. § 5492(c)(4). Yet the sitting Director of OMB now wields ultimate power 
to review and approve any proposed recommendations, testimony, or comments by the CFPB to 
Congress. The same OMB Director will now sign off on the CFPB’s financial operating plans, 
forecasts, and quarterly reports, in violation of 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(4)(E).   
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Defendant Mulvaney is also reviewing and acting on CFPB rules and rulemakings while 
serving as OMB Director. His involvement in CFPB rulemaking is especially problematic in 
light of E.O. 12866, which expressly exempts the CFPB from OIRA rulemaking review. OIRA is 
both an office of OMB, 31 U.S.C. § 505, and an arm of the White House. See The White House, 
OMB Offices, http://bit.ly/2B14gdL (viewed Dec. 5, 2017). OIRA staff report to Defendant 
Mulvaney in his capacity as OMB Director, and Defendant Mulvaney has ultimate authority over 
OIRA’s rulemaking review. 
 As a result, CFPB rulemaking is effectively under OMB review as long as Defendant 
Mulvaney remains the OMB Director. In fact, American Banker quoted Defendant Mulvaney on 
December 4, 2017—after he claimed to be serving as CFPB Acting Director—as saying: “You 
could imagine that the Office of Management and Budget under the Trump administration might 
look very cautiously, even cynically, against rules that were produced by” the previous CFPB 
Director, Richard Cordray. Ian McKendry, Mulvaney’s first days at CFPB:  payday, personnel 
and a prank, AM. BANKER, Dec. 4, 2017. As this demonstrates, Defendant Mulvaney is 
incapable of reviewing CFPB rulemakings independently; instead, he views them from the 
perspective of the White House and OMB. At his November 27 press conference, Defendant 
Mulvaney announced one of his first decisions was to institute a 30-day freeze on all new rules, 
regulations, and guidance issued by the CFPB. See, e.g., http://cs.pn/2AxVT65. More recently, 
Defendant Mulvaney halted implementation of a new CFPB final rule expanding data collection 
on mortgages. See Yuka Hayashi, New CFPB Chief Curbs Data Collection, Citing Cybersecurity 
Worries, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2017. As this suggests, Defendant Mulvaney, while continuing as 
OMB head, has acted aggressively to put CFPB rulemaking under the White House’s control. 
 Defendant Mulvaney’s appointment as Acting Director allows OMB and the White 
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House to stack the CFPB rulemaking process in another way. Under the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA), the CFPB must elicit feedback from small 
businesses regarding proposed rulemakings. 5 U.S.C. § 609(d)(2). SBREFA requires the CFPB 
to convene a review panel for the proposed rule “consisting wholly of full time Federal 
employees of the office within the agency responsible for carrying out the proposed rule [the 
CFPB], the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and 
Budget, and the Chief Counsel” for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration. The 
purpose of the review panel is to issue a public report on “the comments of the small entity 
representatives” and the review panel’s findings. 5 U.S.C. § 609(b).  
 The SBREFA panel’s authorizing legislation gives room to Defendant Mulvaney to 
manipulate the composition of the review panel. Recently, he announced his intent to “add more 
political appointees to the [CFPB’s] ranks . . . pairing them with senior civil servants in areas 
such as . . . regulations.” Lydia Beyoud, Mulvaney Wants More Political Appointees in Place at 
CFPB, BNA BANKING DAILY, Dec. 4, 2017. This raises concerns that as Acting CFPB Director 
Defendant Mulvaney would appoint his political appointees at the CFPB who were aligned with 
OMB and the White House to serve on SBREFA review panels. This, in turn, would rig the 
SBREFA process and help ensure that rulemakings vital to the welfare of American consumers 
do not move forward. 
 The extent of White House direct policy control over the CFPB through Defendant 
Mulvaney is perhaps most clearly shown by Defendant Trump’s tweet on December 8, 2017:   
Fines and penalties against Wells Fargo Bank for their bad acts against their 
customers and others will not be dropped, as has incorrectly been reported, but 
will be pursued and, if anything, substantially increased. I will cut Regs but make 
penalties severe when caught cheating! 
 
Tweet by @realDonald Trump, 7:18am, Dec. 8, 2017, at http://bit.ly/2jv1m6u.  Given that the 
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President lacks statutory authority to determine whether the CFPB pursues an enforcement 
action, much less the fines it imposes or the regulations it will pass or cut, the President’s tweet 
is a remarkable boast of having a power that Congress specifically denied the President.  
 In these myriad ways, Defendant Mulvaney’s appointment as Acting Director of the 
CFPB while continuing to serve as OMB Director puts the White House in direct, day-to-day 
control of the CFPB. This sort of direct political control by the White House, unmediated by a 
for-cause removal standard, a term in office that may outlast the President’s, and Senate 
confirmation, is a direct threat to the CFPB’s statutory independence and the stated will of 
Congress.7  It is precisely these concerns that animated Congress’s choice to reject the FVRA 
mechanism and have the Dodd-Frank Act control the CFPB Directorship succession.  
* * * 
 For the reasons explained above, only the Dodd-Frank Act applies to determine the 
succession of the CFPB Directorship in the event of a vacancy, which means that until and 
unless a Presidential nominee is confirmed by the Senate (or installed through a recess 
appointment), the Deputy Director of the CFPB, Leandra English, serves as the only lawful 
Acting Director.  	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 We note that the CFPB is not the only federal bank regulatory body whose 
independence will be compromised. For if Mr. Mulvaney can serve the Acting Director of the 
CFPB, he will also be a voting member of the board of directors of the FDIC, of the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council, and of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1812(a)(1)(B), (d)(2); 3303; 5321(b)(1)(D), (c)(3). His concurrent tenure as Director 
of OMB will threaten the independence of these additional bank regulatory bodies by 
substituting a sitting White House official for an independent agency head. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the court should grant plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dated: December 8, 2017  /s/ Courtney Weiner 
Courtney Weiner 
 
Courtney Weiner (DC Bar No. 992797) 
LAW OFFICE OF COURTNEY WEINER, PLLC 
1629 K Street, Northwest, Suite 300  
Washington, DC 20006  
(202) 827-9980 
cw@courtneyweinerlaw.com 
 
Counsel for Amici
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APPENDIX OF AMICI CURIAE 
 
 Ethan S. Bernstein is an Assistant Professor in the Organizational Behavior unit and the 
Berol Corporation Fellow at the Harvard Business School. He previously served as the CFPB’s 
Chief Strategy Officer and Deputy Assistant Director of Mortgage Markets. 
 
 Benjamin P. Edwards is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas William S. Boyd School of Law.  He writes about financial regulation and consumer 
protection. 
 
Kathleen C. Engel is a Research Professor of Law at Suffolk University. She serves on 
the CFPB’s Consumer Advisory Board (CAB); however, the views she expresses here are her 
own, not those of the CAB, the CFPB, or the United States.  
 
 Robert Hockett is the Edward Cornell Professor at Cornell Law School, specializing 
in finance and financial regulation. He has previously worked at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York and the International Monetary Fund and is a Fellow of The Century Foundation.  
 
Dalié Jiménez is a Professor of Law at the University of California, Irvine School of 
Law. From 2011-12, she served in the Research, Markets & Regulation division at the CFPB. 
 
 Adam J. Levitin is a Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center. 
He previously served on the CFPB’s CAB and as counsel to the Congressional Oversight Panel 
for the Troubled Asset Relief Program. He is currently engaged as an expert witness by the 
CFPB, but is not representing the Bureau in serving as amicus curiae.  
 
 Patricia A. McCoy is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. In 2011, she 
founded the Mortgage Markets unit at the CFPB and oversaw the Bureau’s mortgage initiatives.  
 
 Christopher Lewis Peterson is the John J. Flynn Endowed Professor of Law at the 
University of Utah’s S.J. Quinney College of Law. From 2012-2016, he was Special Advisor to 
the Director and Senior Counsel for Enforcement Policy & Strategy at the CFPB.  
 
 Jeff Sovern is a Professor of Law at St. John's University School of Law where he has 
taught and written about consumer law for thirty years. 
 
 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. is a Professor of Law at George Washington University Law 
School.  In 2010, he served as a consultant to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the body 
established by Congress to report on the causes of the financial crisis of 2007-09.   
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